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WHOSE PENSION IS IT ANYWAY?
PROTECTING SPOUSAL RIGHTS IN A
PRIVATIZED SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The current Social Security system provides generous pension
benefits to the spouses and surviving spouses of American workers.

Lately, however, many analysts have called for reform of the current
Social Security system in a way that could undermine those benefits.
In particular, many recent Social Security reform proposals call for
the complete or partial privatization of Social Security. The purpose
of this Article is to consider how to protect spouses and surviving
spouses under a privatized Social Security system.'
Proponents of complete or partial privatization of Social
Security typically call for replacing all or a portion of the current
system with a system of individual retirement savings accounts

("IRSA"s). All or a portion of the Social Security taxes that workers
now pay to the federal government would go instead into IRSAs.
Typically, these IRSAs would operate pretty much like today's

Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRA"s)2 and employer 401(k)

* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University;
M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan; M.A.
(Economics) 1983, George Washington University; Delegate to the 1998 National
Summit on Retirement Savings. Research assistance was provided by Angela D. West.
1. The larger question of whether or not to partially or fully privatize Social Security
is beyond the scope of this Article.
This Article builds upon and draws from my earlier research on Social Security. See,
e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement
Program: PartialIntegration and a Creditfor Dual-EarnerCouples, 45 TAX LAW. 915
(1992) [hereinafter Forman, Promoting Fairness]; Jonathan Barry Forman, Social
Security: What CanBe Done About MarriagePenalties?,75 TAX NOTES 270 (1997) and 6
REV. L. WOMEN STUD. 553 (1997) [hereinafter Forman, Social Security]; Jonathan Barry
Forman, The Once and Future Social Security Tax Expenditure, BENEFrrs Q., Third
Quarter 1997, at 77 [hereinafter Forman, Tax Expenditure]; Jonathan Barry Forman,
What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Forman, What Can Be Done?].
2. See I.R.C. § 219 (West Supp. 1998).
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savings plans.' So far, however, relatively little thought has been
given to the question of how to protect the spouses and surviving
spouses of the workers who would be making contributions into these
IRSAs.
In short, the question is what, if any, spousal protections should
be required of IRSAs.
This Article concludes that spousal
protections should be required of IRSAs and outlines how to
structure those spousal protections in a way that would best ensure
that the spouses and surviving spouses of covered workers end up
with adequate retirement incomes. The analysis in this Article
should also help enlighten the debate about Social Security in the
lead article in this Symposium4 and in many of the articles critiqued
therein.5
At the outset, Part II of this Article provides an overview of the
current Social Security system. Part III discusses the need for Social
Security reform. Part IV discusses proposals that would replace all or
a portion of Social Security with a system of IRSAs, and Part V
considers the'nature of spousal rights that should be provided in
IRSAs.
Finally, Part VI concludes that IRSA distribution rules should be
designed -to help assure that individuals and couples will have
adequate retirement incomes throughout their retirement years. Part
VI then outlines a modest proposal for spousal protections under
IRSAs. In particular, Part VI recommends that IRSA distributions
for married couples should typically take the form of indexed, joint
and 75% survivor annuities. Part VI also recommends that the funds
accumulated in IRSAs during marriage should be automatically
divided between divorcing spouses unless the court orders, or the
parties agree, otherwise.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT PROGRAM

The Social Security system includes two related programs that
provide monthly cash benefits to workers and their families. The
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance ("OASI") program provides
monthly cash benefits to retired workers and their dependents and to
survivors of insured workers, and the Disability Insurance ("DI")
program provides monthly cash benefits for disabled workers under
3. See id. § 401(k).
4. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1521 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Nancy C. Stiudt, TaxingHousework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1596-99 (1996).
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age sixty-five and their dependents.6 A worker builds protection
under these programs by working in employment that is covered by
Social Security and by paying the applicable payroll taxes. At
7
present, about 96% of the work force works in covered employment.
At retirement, disability, or death, monthly Social Security benefits
are paid to insured workers and to their eligible dependents and
survivors.
The OASI program is, by far, the larger of these two programs,
and it is usually what people mean when they discuss Social Security.
In 1996, for example, the OASI program paid more than $300 billion
in benefits to almost thirty-eight million Americans.8 On the other
hand, the DI program paid just over $29 billion in benefits to about
six million Americans.9 Consequently, for the remainder of this
Article, the term "Social Security taxes" will refer to OASI taxes, and
the terms "Social Security benefits" and "Social Security retirement
benefits" will refer to OASI benefits.
A.

Social Security Taxes

The federal government uses payroll taxes to finance both Social
Security and Medicare spending.10 To finance the OASI program for
1998, employees were required to pay payroll taxes of 5.35% of the
first $68,400 of wages, and employers paid matching amounts."
6. See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1994)); see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 104TH CONG., 1996 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA
ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

1-115 (Comm. Print 1996) [hereinafter 1996 GREEN BOOK] (providing detailed
information about Social Security and other programs within the jurisdiction of the House
Ways and Means Committee); SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., SOCIAL SECURrrY HANDBOOK 1995, at 53-149 (12th ed. 1995) (providing

detailed information about the operation of Social Security); SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., SOC. SEC. BULL.: 1995 ANN. STATISTICAL SUPP.
52 (providing explanations and detailed information about a variety of social welfare
programs).
7. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 6, at 5.
8. See Current OperatingStatistics: List of Tables, 60 SoC. SEC. BULL. 67, 69, 71
(1997) [hereinafter CurrentOperatingStatistics].
9. See id. at 69.
10. For 1998, employees paid payroll taxes of 7.65% of the first $68,400 of wages and
1.45% of wages over $68,400, and employers paid matching amounts. See 1998 Cost-ofLiving Increase and Other Determinations, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,762, 58,764 (1997)
[hereinafter 1998 Social Security COLA Determinations]. Similarly, self-employed
workers paid an equivalent Social Security tax of 15.3% of up to $68,400 of net earnings
from covered self-employment and 2.9% on self-employment earnings over $68,400. See
id.
11. See SOCIAL SEC. & MEDICARE BDS. OF TRUSTEES, STATUS OF THE SOCIAL
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Similarly, self-employed workers paid an equivalent Social Security
tax of 10.7% of up to $68,400 of net earnings from covered selfemployment."2 In short, 10.7% of covered earnings are used to
finance Social Security retirement benefits. The Social Security
13
taxable earnings cap ($68,400 in 1998) is indexed for inflation.
B.

Social Security Retirement Benefits

Social Security retirement benefits are provided to workers who
retire any time after reaching age sixty-two. Additional benefits are
provided to their dependents and survivors.

1. Worker Benefits
In general, Social Security benefits are related to the earnings
history of the insured worker. Workers over age sixty-two are
entitled to Social Security retirement benefits if they have worked in
covered employment for at least ten years. 4 Benefits are based on a
measure of the worker's earnings history, known as the average
indexed monthly earnings ("AIME"). 5 Basically, the AIME
measures the worker's career-average monthly earnings in covered
employment.
The AIME is linked by formula to the monthly retirement
benefit payable to the worker at normal retirement age.' 6
SECURITY AND MEDICARE PROGRAMS:

The

A SUMMARY OF THE 1997 REPORTS 2 (1997).

Another 0.85% of wages from both the employee and the employer goes to fund
disability benefits, and 1.45% of each goes for Medicare.
12. Another 1.7% of earnings goes for disability insurance and another 2.9% goes for
Medicare insurance. See id.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 430 (Supp. 1997); 1998 Social Security COLA Determinations,
supra note 10, at 58,764.
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 414(a)(2) (1994). More specifically, benefits can be paid
to workers, their dependents, or survivors only if the worker is "insured" for these
benefits. See id. § 402(a)(1). Insured status is measured in terms of "quarters of
coverage." See id. § 414(a). In 1998, a worker earned one quarter of coverage, up to a
total of four, for each $700 of annual earnings reported from covered employment or selfemployment. See 1998 Social Security COLA Determinations, supra note 10, at 58,765.
Workers are fully insured for benefits for themselves and for their families if they have
one quarter of coverage for every four quarters elapsing after 1950 (earned at any time
after 1936), or after the year of reaching age 21, if later, up to the year in which they
reach age 62. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a). Fully insured status is required for eligibility for all
types of benefits except survivor benefits. See id. § 402(a). A person must have at least
six quarters of coverage to be fully insured. See id. § 414(a)(1). A person with 40
quarters of coverage (for example, 10 full years) is "fully insured" for life. See id.
§ 414(a)(2).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b).
16. See id. § 415(a). At present, a worker's normal retirement age is 65, but the
normal retirement age is scheduled to increase gradually to 67 after the year 2000 so that
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monthly retirement benefit payable to a retired worker at normal
retirement age (currently, age sixty-five) is known as the primary

insurance amount ("PIA").'

For a worker reaching age sixty-two in

1998, the PIA equals 90% of the first $477 of the worker's AIME,

32% of the AIME over $477 and through $2875, and 15% of the
AIME over $2875.18 Of note, this progressive benefit formula favors

workers with relatively low career-average earnings. Finally, Social
Security benefits are indexed for inflation.19 In December of 1996,
almost twenty-seven million retired workers were collecting Social

Security retirement benefits, and the average benefit was $745 per
month.2
2. Auxiliary Benefits

Social Security also provides generous additional monthly
benefits to dependents and survivors of covered workers' These socalled auxiliary benefit amounts are also based on a worker's PIA.,

For example, a sixty-five-year-old wife or husband of a retired
worker is entitled to a monthly spousal benefit equal to 50% of the

worker's PIA.23 Consequently, a retired worker and spouse generally
can claim a monthly benefit equal to 150% of what the retired

worker alone could claim. Also, a sixty-five-year-old widow or
widower of the worker is entitled to a monthly surviving spouse
benefit equal to 100% of the worker's PIA.24 In December of 1996,
almost three million spouses of retired workers were collecting
benefits averaging $384 per monthl Similarly, over five million
surviving spouses were collecting benefits averaging $707 per
the normal retirement age will be set at 67 for workers reaching 62 in or after 2022 (67 in
or after 2027).
17. See id.
18. See 1998 Social Security COLA Determinations, supra note 10, at 58,764-65.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i).
20. See Current Operating Statistics, supra note 8, at 73. Of note, Social Security
disability benefits are computed in a similar fashion. In December 1996, over four million
disabled workers were collecting DI benefits, and the average benefit was $704 per
month. See id.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (wife), (c) (husband), (d) (child), (e) (widow), (f)
(widower), (g) (mother and father), (h) (parents).
22. Auxiliary benefits are subject to a variety of limitations. In particular, under the
so-called dual entitlement rule, when an individual can claim both a worker benefit and a
benefit as an auxiliary of another worker, only the larger of the two benefits is paid to the
individual. See id. § 402(k).
23. See id. § 402(b).
24. See id. § 402(e), (f). Also of note, widows and widowers can typically begin
drawing benefits at age 60. See 1996 GREEN BOOK, supra note 6, at 15.
25. See CurrentOperatingStatistics,supra note 8, at 64, 67.
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month. 6
JI.

THE NEED FOR REFORM OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Social Security needs to be reformed for two principal reasons.
First, Social Security is in financial trouble and will not be able to
meet its future benefit commitments. Second, Social Security
redistributes payroll tax revenues in many ways that are quite simply
unfair.
A.

SocialSecurity Is in FinancialTrouble
In 1995, the Trustees of the Social Security Funds estimated that
Social Security is running a deficit equal to 2.17% of payroll, as
computed over the traditional seventy-five-year projection period. 7
That is, payroll tax rates need to be increased a little over 1% each on
employees and employers in order to bring the system back into
actuarial balance. The Trustees also estimated that Social Security
benefits would exceed income starting around 2010 and that the
Social Security system'will be unable to pay its full benefit obligations
after 2029.1
In essence, the federal government must either raise Social
Security taxes or cut Social Security benefits. Worse still, as shown in
the following table, each year that action is delayed, the cost of
bringing Social Security into balance goes up. In short, Social
Security needs to be reformed, and the sooner it is reformed, the
better.

26. See id.
27. See 1995 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS.
AND DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS ANN. REP. 4.
28. See id. at 5-6.
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REQUIRED TAX INCREASES OR BENEFIT CuTS29
Reform

Required

Required Annual

Starting
Date

Increase in
Payroll

Percent Increase in
Revenues or Cut in

Tax Rate

Benefits

2.19%
2.50
3.12
4.04

17.7%
20.5
25.5
33.5

1996
2002
2012
2022

B. Social Security Unfairly RedistributesPayroll Tax
"Contributions"
A casual observer of the current Sobial Security retirement
system would see that it is a pay-as-you-go social welfare system that
takes payroll taxes from current workers and redistributes those
funds to current retirees and their families. On closer inspection,
however, most experts agree that it is more appropriate to view
Social Security from a lifetime perspective. That is, we should
compare what a worker pays in Social Security taxes with the benefits
that the worker can expect to receive at retirement.
Of course, even when we look at Social Security from a lifetime
perspective, it is clear that Social Security redistributes massive
amounts of money. There are clearly winners and losers0
In
particular, Social Security favors current retirees over future retirees,
low-earners over high-earners, larger families over smaller families,
married couples over unmarried individuals, one-earner couples over
two-earner couples, and elderly retirees over elderly workers.' In
short, not everyone gets his or her "money's worth" out of Social
29. See COMMrrEE FOR ECON. DEV., FIXING SOCIAL SECURITY: A STATEMENT
BY THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMrlTEE OF THE COMMF[TEE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 43 (1997).

30. Indeed, the link between the Social Security retirement taxes paid by workers and
the Social Security retirement benefits that they can expect to receive is actually quite
loose and can vary dramatically based on such factors as family status, income, and age.
See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin et al., Social Security: A Financial Appraisal Across and
Within Generations,40 NAT'L TAX J. 19, 26-30 (1987). That is, relative to a program in
which each worker earned an actuarially fair rate of return on payroll taxes paid, the
current Social Security retirement program results in significant transfers that favor some
workers over others.
31. See, e.g., Forman, PromotingFairness,supra note 1, at 937-48; Forman, What Can
Be Done?, supra note 1, at 14-19.
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Security.
Concerns about unfair redistribution have led many analysts to
recommend sweeping changes to Social Security."2 Of course,
whether or not a particular form of redistribution is unfair is a matter
over which there is great dispute. At one extreme, defenders of the
current system argue that Social Security is an insurance program,
that redistribution is inherent in any insurance program, and that the
redistribution that occurs in Social Security is all fair.33 At the other
extreme, some analysts seem to believe that virtually all forms of
redistribution are unfair 4 Not surprisingly, these critics are inclined
to replace Social Security with a program that has little or no
redistribution, perhaps by allowing workers to deposit their payroll
tax "contributions" into their own private IRSAs.
Of course, most reformers fall somewhere in between these two
extremes. Most analysts believe that some forms of redistribution
are appropriate for a Social Security system, even though other forms
of redistribution may strike these analysts as unfair.35
Not
surprisingly, virtually all of the recent proposals to reform Social
Security would retain some forms of redistribution while curtailing
others.
IV. RECENT SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM PROPOSALS

Social Security reform recently has become a hot topic. Subpart
A provides an overview of some of the major Social Security reform
proposals, and Subpart B details one of the most prominent
proposals calling for IRSAs.

32. See, for example, sources cited in Forman, Promoting Fairness,supra note 1, at
948-57.
33. See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 5-24 (1977);
Robert M. Ball, Social Security Across the Generations, in SOCIAL SECURITY AND
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING ACROSS GENERATIONS 11 (John R. Gist ed., 1988).
34. See, e.g., KARL BORDEN, DISMANTLING THE PYRAMID: THE WHY AND How OF
PRIVATIZING SOCIAL SECURITY (The Cato Institute Project on Social Security
Privatization No. 1, 1995), available at <http://wvw.cato.orglpubs/ssps/ssples.html>
(visited Apr. 13, 1998); Peter Ferrara & John R. Lott, Jr., Rates of Return Promised by
Social Security to Today's Young Workers, in SOCIAL SECURITY: PROSPECrS FOR REAL
REFORM 13 (Cato Institute ed., 1985).
35. For example, elsewhere I have argued against the way that Social Security's
redistribution of payroll taxes favors married couples over unmarried couples and
individuals. At the same time, however, I believe that Social Security should redistribute
revenues in a way that favors individuals with low lifetime earnings. See, e.g., Forman,
Social Security, supra note 1; Jonathan Barry Forman, Why Treat Today's Women as If It
Were the 1930s?, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1997, at M2.
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A. An Overview of Recent Social Security Reform Proposals
1. The 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council
In January of 1997, the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory
Council issued a long-awaited report on how to reform the Social
Security system.36 The Council members were not able to achieve a
consensus. Instead, three different reform proposals were offered for
consideration. Under the so-called Maintain Benefits ("MB")
approach supported by six of the thirteen Council members, the
current Social Security system would remain pretty much as it is,
except for a few changes around the margins.
On the other hand, a majority of the Advisory Council (seven of
the thirteen members) did favor making some fairly major changes to
Social Security. In particular, these seven Council members agreed
that at least a portion of Social Security payroll tax contributions
should be redirected into IRSAs that would invest in the stock
market.
Under the so-called Individual Accounts ("IA") approach, these
individual accounts would be held by the government, invested in
secure equity funds, and annuitized on retirement. 38 Alternatively,
under the so-called Personal Security Accounts ("PSA") approach,
these individual accounts would be held by financial institutions and
their investment would be directed by individual workers.3 9
2. The Committee for Economic Development
Also in 1997, the Committee for Economic Development issued
a report on Social Security reform in which it advocated leaving the
basic Social Security system pretty much intact but creating a second
tier of privately owned, personal retirement accounts ("PRA"s).4 °

Both employers and employees would be required to contribute 1.5%
of payroll to these PRAs, and the self-employed would be required to
contribute the entire 3%.41 These mandatory accounts would receive
36. See 1-2 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., REPORT OF THE 1994-1996
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURrrY (1997).
37. See I id. at 25-27.
38. See 1 id. at 28-29.
39. See 1 id. at 30-33; see also Reports of the Technical Panelon Trends and Issues in
Retirement Savings, in 2 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 36, at 87-90
(discussing individual Social Security retirement accounts).
40. See COMMITTEE FOR ECON. DEV., supranote 29, at 49-54.

41. See id. The Committee for Economic Development's proposal for mandatory
individual retirement savings accounts looks a lot like the Mandatory Universal Pension
System ("MUPS") recommended by The President's Commission on Pension Policy in
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preferential tax treatment just like other employer-sponsored
pension plans.
3. Chilean-Style Privatization
A number of analysts suggest that we should privatize Social
Security, specifically by completely replacing the current Social
Security system with a system of IRSAs. 42 Proponents of
privatization typically point to the country of Chile, which began to
privatize its Social Security system in 1981. 43 Under Chile's new
Social Security system, workers are required to contribute at least
10% of their salary to IRSAs held by private pension funds of their
choosing. Contributions to these individual accounts are exempt
from tax, and the accounts are also tax-exempt, but withdrawals are
taxable. There are about twenty different companies that manage
these new IRSAs, subject to extensive regulation by the government.
The Chilean example is already being followed by a number of
other countries, including Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Mexico." For that matter, the World Bank has begun to encourage45
most countries to include IRSAs in their Social Security systems.
Replacing a portion of Social Security with IRSAs has also found a
good deal of support in Congress,46 in academic circles,47 and in the
1981. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POL'Y, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A
NATIONAL RETIREMENT POLICY 41-52 (1981). Basically, the MUPS proposal would
have required employers to contribute 3% of wages to individual accounts for workers.
See id. The proposal drew little interest at the time.
42. See, for example, the sources cited suprain note 34.
43. See, e.g., Barbara E. Kritzer, PrivatizingSocialSecurity: The Chilean Experience,
59 SOC. SEC. BULL. 45, 45 (1996); Robert J. Myers, Chile's Social Security Reform After
10 Years, BENEFITS Q., Third Quarter 1992, at 44; Joseph L. Scarpaci & Ernesto
Miranda-Radic, Chile, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON OLD-AGE INSURANCE 25
(Martin B. Tracy & Fred C. Pampel eds., 1991).
44. See, e.g., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., No. 1 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INSTITUTE NOTES, CHILEAN SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM AS A PROTOTYPE
FOR OTHER NATIONS 1-6 (1997); Michael Alan Paskin, Privatizationof Old-Age Pensions
in Latin America: Lessons for Social Security Reform in the United States, 62 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2199 (1994).
45. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO
PROTECT THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH 233-54 (1994) (promoting a multipillar
retirement system).
46. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN COMM'N ON ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM, FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 26, 40, 221-22 (1995) (favoring a personal investment plan
option for all workers in lieu of 1.5% of the payroll tax); BORDEN, supranote 34, at 10-14;
Kerry, Simpson Offer Plan to Reform Social Security, Make Other Changes, 22 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1243 (May 22,1995).
47. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOC. INS., SOCIAL SECURITY: WHAT ROLE
FOR THE FUTURE? 225-33 (Peter A. Diamond et al. eds., 1996); Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
PrivatizingSocialSecurity at Home and Abroad,86 AM. ECON. REv. 368,370-71 (1996).

1998]

CRITICAL TAX THEORY

1663

press.48

B.

The PersonalSecurity Accounts Proposal
This Subpart offers a more in-depth look at how a typical
proposal to replace a portion of the Social Security system with
IRSAs would work. Specifically, this Subpart explains the PSA
proposal recently recommended by five of the thirteen members of
the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security4 9
Under the PSA plan, the current Social Security system would
be replaced with a two-tiered system. The first tier would provide a
flat retirement benefit for all workers, and the second tier would
provide workers with privately owned individual retirement savings
accounts, referred to as PSAs. This so-called PSA plan was designed
to be implemented on January 1, 1998, but has not yet been enacted.
It would be fully effective for workers under the age of twenty-five;
workers between twenty-five and fifty-four would receive a mix of
benefits; and current retirees and workers age fifty-five and older
would continue to be covered by the current Social Security system
(albeit with a few minor changes).
1. A First-Tier Flat Benefit
Under the first tier, workers under age twenty-five in 1998 who
work at least thirty-five years in covered employment would receive a
flat dollar benefit equivalent to $410 monthly in 1996 dollars. 0 These
benefits would be financed by employer Social Security contributions
that would continue to be excludable from the employee's income.
Consequently, the resulting first-tier benefits would be fully taxable.
Workers age twenty-five to fifty-four would receive a composite
first-tier benefit that would include their accrued benefit under the
current Social Security system and a prorated share of the new firsttier flat benefit. As with younger workers, the first-tier flat benefits
of these workers would be fully taxable. In addition, half of the rest
of their composite first-tier benefits would be taxable, reflecting the
48. See, e.g., Gene Steuerle, Privatizing Social Security: A Third Option, 73 TAX
NOTES 1235, 1357 (1996); George Church & Richard Lacayo, The Casefor Killing Social
Security, TIME, Mar. 20, 1995, at 31, 31; James K. Glassman, Retire Social Security, WASH.
POST, Dec. 12, 1995, at A17; Donald Lambro, Savvy Advice on Social Security, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 30,1997, at A13.
49. See 1 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 36, at 30-33.
50. Workers with less than 35 years of covered employment would earn half of the
flat benefit in 10 years, with a 2% increment for each additional year of work up to 25

years.
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share of benefits financed by previously excluded employer
contributions.
2. A Second-Tier Individual Retirement Savings Account
Under Tier Two, the plan would create PSAs that would be
dedicated to retirement savings. These PSAs would be financed by
reallocating five percentage points of the employee's share of Social
Security taxes. Every worker under age fifty-five in 1998 would
participate in the 5% payroll reallocation and receive PSA benefits
based on their accumulations plus interest. Individuals could begin
withdrawing funds from their PSAs at age sixty-two, and any funds
remaining in their accounts at death could be passed on to their
estates. The proceeds from PSA accounts (including the inside build
up) would not be taxable. In short, PSAs would be financed with
(already income-taxed) employee contributions; the accounts
themselves would be tax-exempt; and distributions from the accounts
would also be tax-free.
V. APPROACHES TO PROVIDING SPOUSAL RIGHTS IN INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

This Part considers various approaches that could be used in
designing spousal rights for any Social Security reform that includes
IRSAs. At the outset, however, it is worth reiterating that Social
Security currently provides spouses with an additional monthly
benefit equal to roughly 50% of the worker's benefit, and it provides
surviving spouses with a monthly benefit equal to roughly 100% of
the worker's benefit. Subpart A outlines a variety of alternative
approaches that could serve as models for IRSA spousal rights, and
Subpart B explains some of the spousal rights protections that have
been included in recent IRSA proposals.
A. Approachesfor SpousalRights in IRSAs
This Subpart outlines a variety of approaches that could serve as
models for IRSA spousal rights. Although there is a range of
plausible approaches, the most pertinent rules are those that
currently apply to private pension plans covered by the Employee
51
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").

51. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (1994) and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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1. Co-Ownership, Partnership, and Trust Models
Alternative models for IRSA spousal rights could be based upon
such diverse legal arrangements as co-ownership, partnerships, or
trusts. With respect to co-ownership, consider the gamut of possible
arrangements for a joint bank account. These arrangements can run
from requiring both signatures for each and every withdrawal to
allowing either signatory to withdraw the full balance of the account
at any time without notice to the other. Similarly, at death, coownership can result in anything from an equal split of the account
balance to a survivor-takes-all regime. Hence, any of a range of coownership approaches could serve as a model for spousal rights in
IRSAs.
Another approach would be to imagine marriage as an equal
partnership and subject IRSAs to the usual partnership rules. In that
regard, however, it is worth noting that Tulane University Law
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser has found little empirical evidence to
support the traditional view of marriage as an equal partnership
between a man and a woman.5" Trust law could form yet another
alternative model for IRSA spousal rights. A worker might be
compelled to use IRSA accumulations for the exclusive benefit of the
couple. Presumably, some kind of breach of trust action would result
from any misuse of the accumulated IRSA funds.
2. The Defined Benefit Plan Model
Alternatively, IRSA spousal rights could be modeled after the
spousal protections now required of private pension plans. In that
regard, many private pensions take the form of defined benefit plans.
A defined benefit plan provides retirement benefits calculated by a
prescribed formula specified in the plan. The benefit formula is
typically expressed as a straight-life annuity. For example, a plan
might provide that a worker could retire with a pension equal to 2%
of his final pay for each year of service. In that case, a thirty-year
worker whose final pay was $100,000 a year would retire with a
pension of $60,000 a year for life ($60,000 = 2% x 30 x $100,000).
Defined benefit plans typically provide spousal protections in

52 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The PartnershipModel of
Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1419-20 (1996). My
own experience seems to echo Professor Kornhauser's findings. For example, certain
property in my own marriage also seems to escape the partnership characterization. In
particular, I only rarely get to drive my wife's 1972 Chevrolet Chevelle SuperSport (red
with white racing stripes).

1666

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

several ways. 3 First, most defined benefit plans pay benefits in the
form of an annuity. Second, all defined benefit plans must provide a
survivor annuity option. Third, all defined benefit plans must
provide a survivor annuity in case the worker dies before retirement.
Fourth, a divorcing spouse can secure an interest in the other
spouse's pension plans by obtaining a qualified domestic relations
order ("QDRO").
a.

Annuitization

Most defined benefit plans pay out benefits in the form of a
single life annuity covering the retiree or, alternatively, in the form of
a joint and survivor annuity covering the retiree and spouse. 4 Some
defined benefit plans, however, allow the retiree to receive a lumpsum payment instead of an annuity. About 10% of the defined
benefit plans of medium and large businesses allow the retiree to
select a lump-sum distribution. 5
By spreading payments over a period of years, annuitization
provides at least some spousal protection, even if the benefit is
payable as a single-life annuity over the life of the retiree. On the
other hand, there is a good deal of evidence that lump-sum
distributions are quickly dissipated.5 6
b.

Qualified Joint and Survivor Annuities

Since the passage of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984
("REA"),5 7 ERISA has required defined benefit plans to provide a
53. It is also worth noting that the ERISA rules for dividing pensions and for spousal
rights preempt any state laws that might otherwise apply to such property. See, e.g.,
Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754, 1761 (1997); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property
Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers' Compensation, and Other Wage
Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250, 1260-61
(1986); Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 619
(1994); Stacy Lynn Anderson, Comment, The Right to Pension Benefits Under ERISA
When a Nonemployee Spouse Predeceasesthe Employee Spouse, 67 WASH. L. REV. 625,
631-32 (1992); Paul E. Mansur, Comment, ERISA Preemption, Community Property,and
the Nonemployee Spouse: A Study in Confused Equities, 30 HoUS. L. REV. 1695, 16981700 (1993).
54. Joint and survivor annuities are discussed infra in Part V.A.2.b.
55. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS IN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 1993, at 114,122 (1994).
56. See, e.g., G. LAWRENcE ATKINS, SPEND IT OR SAVE IT? PENSION LUMP-SUM
DISTRIBUTIONS AND TAX REFORM 55-57 (Employee Benefit Research Inst. EBRI-ERF
Research Report 1986); John R. Woods, Pension Vesting and PreretirementLump Sums
Among Full-Time PrivateSector Employees, 56 SOc. SEC. BULL. 3, 3 (1993).
57. Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.); see also Anne Moss, Women's Pension Reform: Congress Inches
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spouse with annuity payments of at least 50% of the retiree's
payments after the retiree's death.58 All defined benefit plans must
provide these survivor annuities, unless the spouse consents to an
alternative form of payment. The most prevalent type of survivor
benefit is the so-called "qualified joint and survivor annuity"
("QJSA"). 59 A QJSA is an annuity for the life of the spouse that is
not less than 50% (and not greater than 100%) of the annuity
payable during the joint lives of the retiree and spouse. Although
some plans offer only one joint and survivor option that pays the
surviving spouse 50% of the retiree's pension, most offer a choice of
two or more alternative percentages (for example, 50%, 67%, and
100%) to be continued for the spouse.60
When a QJSA is selected, the retiree will typically receive a
lower benefit during retirement to account for the likely increase in
the number of years that the pension plan will have to make
payments.61 Consequently, monthly benefits must be lower under a
QJSA than under a single life annuity for the worker, that is, unless
the employer chooses to subsidize the surviving spousal benefit. In a
way, this consequence can pit the retiree and spouse against each
other: the larger the surviving spouse benefit, the smaller the benefit
that can be enjoyed while the retiree is alive. 62
Not surprisingly, a relatively low percentage of workers choose
to take their benefits in the form of joint and survivor annuities.
According to Census data, of the more than five million married
retirees receiving private pension annuities in 1994, just 59%
reported that they had selected the joint and survivor annuity option,
Toward Equity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 165 (1985) (explaining REA); Camilla E.
Watson, Broken PromisesRevisited: The Window of Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses
Under ERISA, 76 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1991) (same).
58. See ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994); see also I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417
(West Supp. 1998) (addressing tax implications of defined benefit pension plans);
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 114 (describing the QJSA regime).
59. All of the defined benefit plans of medium and large businesses provide for
survivor benefits, and 95% provide QJSAs. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra
note 55, at 123.
60. Twenty-six percent of the defined benefit plans of medium and large businesses
provide for QJSAs with only a 50% survivor benefit, and 65% let the retiree choose from
a range of survivor percentages. See id.
61. In that regard, consider a worker and spouse, both age 65, retiring in 1998. An
examination of the Treasury Regulations suggests that the retiring worker and spouse
each have a life expectancy of 20 years, see Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 tbl.5 (1986), but together
the couple has a joint life expectancy of 25 years, see id. § 1.72-9 tbl.6.
62. Cf. 1 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 36, at 150 (statement of
Edith U. Fierst) (arguing in favor of the current Social Security system's spousal subsidies
and against moving to IRSAs).
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38% reported that they did not, and 3% did not know or did not
respond.63 Worse still, only 7% of the 513,000 divorced retirees
receiving private pension annuities in 1994 reported selecting the
joint and survivor option. 64
The percentage of married retirees selecting joint and survivor

annuities has increased since the Retirement Equity Act of 1974
made QJSA the default. Nevertheless, only 62% of married and
divorced retirees starting their annuities in 1993-1994 reported
selecting joint and survivor annuities. 65
All this evidence stands in sharp contrast to the current Social
Security system. At the end of 1994, Social Security paid monthly
benefits to over 26 million retired workers, to more than 3 million
spouses of retired workers, and to more than 5 million survivors of
retired workers. 66
c.

Qualified Preretirement Survivor Annuities

Defined benefit plans must also provide survivor benefits in case
the worker dies before retirement. 67 Typically, a surviving spouse
will receive an annuity equal to the minimum amount payable if the
employee had retired on the day before death with a QJSA.6 Thus,
the minimum benefit is roughly equal in value to 50% of the pension
that the worker would have been entitled to if the worker had just
retired. 69

These

so-called

"qualified

preretirement

survivor

annuities" ("QPSA"s) must start no later than the month in which

63. See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, RETIREMENT BENEFITS

OF AMERICAN WORKERS 101-02 (1995).
64. See id.
65. See id, see also Karen C. Holden, Determinants of Joint and Survivor Benefit
Choices: Effects of Changing Work and MaritalPatterns,in THE CENTER FOR PENSION
AND RETIREMENT RESEARCH CONFERENCE 1996, at 35 (Miami University, Miami,
Ohio, May 31-June 1, 1996) [hereinafter Holden, Determinants of Joint and Survivor
Benefit Choices] (reporting evidence that suggests, among other things, that married men
were more likely to choose the QJSA option after the passage of ERISA); Karen C.
Holden, Women as Widows Under a Reformed Social Security System, in PROSPECTS FOR
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (Pension Research Council, Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania, 1997 Symposium, May 12-13, 1997) (reporting evidence that
suggests, inter alia, that married men seem to be more likely to choose against the QJSA
when their wives have their own pensions and that men in their second marriages may
also be less likely to select QJSAs favoring their second wives).
66. See Current OperatingStatistics, supra note 8, at 75.
67. See ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1994); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(11), 417 (West Supp.
1998).
68. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 114.
69. The benefit can be further reduced to take into account the appropriate early
retirement adjustment.
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the worker would have reached early retirement, but can be forfeited
if the spouse does not survive until then.70 Eighty-one percent of the
defined benefit plans of medium and large businesses provide only
the minimum required QPSA benefit.7 '
d. Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and the AntiAlienation Rule
ERISA also has an anti-alienation rule that generally prevents
creditors from reaching the pension plan benefits of retirees and their
spouses. 72 This provision helps ensure that the retiree and spouse will
continue to receive their pension benefits throughout retirement.
Moreover, since the enactment of the REA, there is an
exception to the anti-alienation rule that allows state courts to split a
worker's pension so as to assure adequate support for a worker's
(ex-) spouse or dependents after a divorce or other family-related
proceeding. Pertinent here, state courts can issue a so-called QDRO
that provides that a spouse or ex-spouse is entitled to receive al or a
part of a worker's pension benefits. 73 Unfortunately, many spouses
are unaware of QDRO protection and so do not ask that the
worker's pension be divided. 74
3. The Defined Contribution Plan Model
A defined contribution plan is a pension plan in which the
employer's contribution is prescribed and the benefit depends on the
contribution plus the investment return. Individual accounts are set
up for the participants, and the benefit at retirement depends on the
balance in those accounts at retirement. For example, an employer
70. See ERISA § 205(e)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20

(1988).
71. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 123.
72. See ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994); I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (West
Supp. 1998).
73. See ERISA § 206(d)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994); I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(13)(B) (West Supp. 1998). There are, of course, numerous procedural
requirements, probably the most important of which is that the QDRO may not require
the pension plan to provide any form of benefits that are not otherwise available under
the plan. See ERISA § 206(d)(3)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (1994). See generally
David L. Baumer & J.C. Poindexter, Women and Divorce: The Perils of Pension
Division, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 203 (1996) (suggesting that many courts are systematically
undervaluing defined benefit plans in a way that prejudices women); Anne E. Moss &
Vicki Gottlich, The Divisible Pension: Another Income Source for Low-Income Divorced
Clients, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 283 (1995) (discussing ways to secure QDROs for lowincome women); Mary A. Throne, Note, Pension Awards in Divorce and Bankruptcy, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 194 (1988) (discussing QDROs and bankruptcy).
74. See Moss & Gottlich, supra note 73, at 283-84.
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might contribute 10% of an employee's salary each year to a defined
contribution plan. At retirement, the balance in the employee's
account would be equal to those sums plus the investment earnings
thereon.
So-called 401(k) savings plans are also considered defined
contribution plans.75 These plans allow workers to choose between
receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing the money in
a retirement account, and they are sometimes called cash or deferred
arrangements.
At retirement, defined contribution plans must allow the
employee to withdraw the entire balance of an employee's account in
the form of a lump sum, but employees are often allowed to choose
alternative forms of payout, such as a lifetime annuity or installments
over a specified period.76 About 30% of the plans of medium and
large businesses allow the retiree to select annuity distributions, and
48% allow them to select installment distributions.77
Also, prior to retirement, many plans allow workers to withdraw
all or a portion of their individual accounts, 8 and many plans allow
workers to borrow against their accounts. 79 For example, about 47%
of the plans of medium and large businesses permit withdrawals, and
48% permit loans.80
Defined contribution plans are generally subject to the same
ERISA rules that govern defined benefit plans; however, most
defined contribution plans are not subject to the QJSA and QPSA
rules as long as they provide that if the worker dies, the spouse will
receive the balance of the individual account.8' During the worker's
life, though, the worker is relatively free to make withdrawals from
the account (or borrow against the account) and need not even
secure spousal consent. The danger is that such withdrawals (or
loans) could leave the spouse with little or no retirement benefits.
Nevertheless, despite the growing importance of defined contribution
plans in general, and 401(k) plans in particular, Congress recently

75. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (West Supp. 1998).
76. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supranote 55, at 133.
77. See id. at 147.
78. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(d)(2) (1995) (discussing "hardship"
distributions for 401(k) savings plans).
79. See ERISA § 408(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (1994); I.R.C. § 72(p) (West Supp.
1998). Spousal consent is required only if the underlying plan is subject to the rules
governing spousal annuities. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20 (1988).
80. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 55, at 135.
81. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(B) (West Supp. 1998).
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refused to extend the spousal consent protections to 401(k) plans.2
Defined contribution plans are, however, subject to the QDRO

provisions. Also, there are numerous other special rules for spouses.
For example, one provision allows the surviving spouse to delay the

commencement of distributions until the 8date
on which the worker
3
would have reached age seventy and a half.

4. The Individual Retirement Account Model
IRAs are not pension plans covered by ERISA. Consequently,

they are not subject to ERISA's QJSA and QPSA rules. They are,
however, subject to QDRO-like rules.'

Moreover, IRAs may be

inherited (for example, by the spouse), and the distribution rules are
similar to those covering defined contribution plans.' It is also worth
noting that special rules allow certain individuals to set up so-called
spousal IRAs and make deductible IRA contributions on -behalf of
non-working spouses. 86
5. The Earnings Sharing Model

Another model for IRSA spousal rights is known as earnings
sharing.s7 In its simplest form, earnings sharing would eliminate the

current Social Security system's spouse and surviving spouse benefits.
Instead, each spouse in a married couple would be credited with onehalf of the couple's combined earnings during marriage. In the end,
each spouse's Social Security benefit would be based on one-half of
the married couple's earnings credits during marriage plus whatever

82. See Anita Cosgrove, Kennelly Joins Moseley-Braun to Reintroduce Women's
Pension Protection Act in Congress, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 491 (Feb. 24, 1997);
Anita Cosgrove, Pension Simplification: Employers Oppose Budget Provisionfor Spousal
Consent on 401(k) Assets, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1562 (July 7, 1997); Anita
Cosgrove, Tax Legislation: GOP Leaders Drop Spousal Consent, but Keep Employer
Stock Limit in Tax Bill, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1731 (July 28, 1997).
83. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 1998).
84. See id. § 408(d)(6).
85. See id. § 408(a)(6).
86. See id. § 219(c).
87. See, e.g., Earnings Sharing Implementation: Hearing Before the Task Force on
Social Security and Women of the Subcomm. on Retirement Income and Employment of
the House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong. (1984); STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 99TH CONG., REPORT ON EARNINGS SHARING IMPLEMENTATION
STUDY (Comm. Print 1985); U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, EARNINGS
SHARING OPTIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (1986); TECHNICAL COMM. ON
EARNINGS SHARING, CTR. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY STUDIES, EARNINGS SHARING IN
SOCIAL SECURITY: A MODEL FOR REFORM (Edith U. Fierst & Nancy Duff Campbell
eds., 1988).
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earnings credits each of them accrued before or after the marriage."8
The earnings sharing approach has often been suggested as a means
of dividing current Social Security benefits between spouses.
Something like earnings sharing could be applied to IRSAs.
Each IRSA of a married worker could be split between the two
spouses when contributions are made, at divorce, at retirement, or at
death.
6. A Two-Tier System
Another way to protect spouses and surviving spouses might be
to provide a first-tier Social Security benefit that was sufficient to
make it unnecessary to impose any restrictions at all on the secondtier IRSAs. 9 With a high enough first-tier benefit for spouses and
other retirees, one simply would not have to worry about spousal
protections for second-tier IRSA benefits. 9°
B. Spousal Rights Under Various Reform Proposals
This Subpart considers changes in spousal rights that have been
suggested in several of the recent Social Security reform proposals.
1. The 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council Proposals
a.

Changes to Spousal Benefits Under the Current Social
Security System
The Social Security Advisory Council recently recommended
"increasing Social Security's survivor benefits to the higher of the
decedent's benefit (that is, the present-law survivor's benefit), or
75% of the combined benefit that the survivor and decedent spouse
were receiving when both were alive." 91 In support of this change,
88. For example, consider a couple in which the primary worker earned $45,000 in a
given year and the secondary worker earned $5000. Under the current Social Security
system, the primary worker is credited with $45,000 of earnings, and the secondary
worker is credited with just $5000 of earnings. Under earnings sharing, each would be
credited with $25,000 of earnings for that year for purposes of computing benefits.
89. See, for example, Forman, PromotingFairness, supra note 1, at 949-50, and the
sources cited therein. Alternatively, one could provide an expanded welfare program
underneath a proportional earnings-related Social Security program.
90. In that regard, most experts already favor raising the current level of benefits
under Supplemental Security Income, our nation's welfare program for the elderly and
the disabled. For example, in 1992, a bipartisan panel of experts recommended increasing
the federal benefit standard to 120% of the poverty guideline for one person, and keeping
the federal benefit standard for a couple at 150% of the standard for an individual. See
SSI ModernizationProject FinalReport of the Experts, 55 Soc. SEC. BULL. 22,23 (1992).
91. 1 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 36, at 19. The proposal would
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the Council relied on statistical studies that "suggest that it costs
retired survivors about three-fourths as much to live as it takes
retired couples." 9 All in all, raising the surviving spouse benefit
would provide needed income assistance to poor widows and
widowers. 93
To partially pay for the cost of increasing the benefits for
surviving spouses, the Council recommended cutting the spousal
benefit from 50% to 33% of a worker's benefit (or to a flat dollar
amount). 94 This change, which has also been endorsed by the
Committee for Economic Development, 95 would reduce marriage
penalties, ideally without having too harmful an impact on retired
couples.
The MB plan made no other significant recommendations with
respect to spousal benefits. On the other hand, both the IA plan and
the PSA plan recommended adding a second-tier of IRSAs on top of
the basic Social Security system, and, consequently, both considered
the issue of spousal rights for IRSAs.
b.

Spousal Benefits Under the Individual Accounts Plan

Under the IA plan, future Social Security benefits would be cut
to match the projected shortfall in future Social Security revenues.96
The IA plan would then collect an additional 1.6% of covered payroll
from workers and deposit those additional contributions into a new
second-tier of individual retirement savings accounts.
When a worker elected to retire (at any time after age sixtytwo), the accumulated funds in these individual accounts would be
converted to single or joint minimum guarantee indexed annuities.
The minimum guarantee provision would assure that something
would be payable even if the individual died immediately. For
example, the IA plan suggests that an amount equal to at least one
year's worth of annuity might be paid to the estate of a worker who
died soon after retirement. As for married workers, the IA plan
usually increase the surviving spouse benefit by 12.5%. Recall that couples usually
receive a benefit equal to 150% of the worker's PIA. Seventy-five percent of that benefit
is 112.5% of the worker's PIA (112.5% = 75% x 150%). That would be a 12.5% increase
over the current 100%-of-PIA surviving spouse benefit.
92. lid.
93. See 1 id. at 142-45 (statement of Edith U. Fierst).
94. See 1 id. at 19.
95. See COMMTrEE FOR ECON. DEv., supranote 29, at 50.
96. See 1 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 36, at 28-29. For example,
the IA plan would cut future benefits by raising the normal retirement age to 70. See, e.g.,
1 id. at 182.
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would follow the usual rules for defined benefit plans; that is, a
married worker would have a choice (with consent of the spouse) on
whether to take a single-life or a joint and survivor annuity.
Also, if a worker died before reaching retirement age, the
accumulated funds would inure to the surviving spouse and would be
payable (in the form of an annuity) when the surviving spouse
became eligible for widower's benefits at age sixty. If the worker
died without leaving a surviving spouse, the accumulated funds would
go to the worker's estate. Finally, it appears that QDRO-like rules
would allow courts to split individual accounts at divorce or
separation. 97
c.

Spousal Benefits Under the Personal Security Accounts Plan
The PSA plan would cut future Social Security benefits more
dramatically, and add a second tier of PSAs on top of a reformed and
reduced Social Security first tier. 9 PSAs would be funded by
allocating 5% of payroll from employees and putting it in individual
retirement savings accounts.
At retirement, workers would be permitted to purchase
annuities with some or all of the funds accumulated in their PSAs,
but they would not be required to do so.99 As for married couples,
each worker's account would be separate from any accounts the
spouse might be accumulating. Spouses would be allowed to inherit
each other's accounts, 100 and, presumably, PSA accounts could be
split at divorce or separation under the usual QDRO rules.0 1
Beyond that, it would appear that a spouse would have no inherent
rights in a worker's account, not even the right to information about
the balance."° Proponents of the PSA plan seem to believe that
spouses would be protected largely by the Council's recommended
increase in the first-tier Social Security surviving spouse benefit and
by the increased IRSA balances that would come from the PSA
plan's allocation of a larger share of payroll taxes to IRSAs (that is,
5% of payroll rather than the 1.6% allocated under the IA plan). 103

97.
98.
99.
100.

See 1 id. at 150 (statement of Edith U. Fierst).
See 1 id. at 30-33.
See 1 id. at 117 (statement of Joan T. Bok et al.).
See 1 id. at 124 (statement of Joan T. Bok et al.).

101. See 1 id. at 150 (statement of Edith U. Fierst).
102. See 1Id. at 72 (statement of Robert M. Ball et al.).
103. See 1 id. at 122-24 (statement of Joan T. Bok et al.).
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2. The Committee for Economic Development Personal Retirement
Account Proposal
The Committee for Economic Development would also cut
future Social Security benefits to meet the projected shortfall in
revenues, and add a second tier of PRAs on top of the reduced and
reformed Social Security first tier.' 4 These PRAs would be funded
by requiring workers to contribute another 3% of payroll to those
accounts.
At retirement, the funds accumulated in these individual
accounts could be withdrawn only gradually, presumably through
forced annuitization of account balances. 0 5 No early withdrawals or
borrowing before retirement would be permitted. 6 PRAs would
also be subject to the usual ERISA rules governing private pension
plans, 401(k)s, and IRAs, revised as needed.'" Presumably, that
means that PRAs would be subject to the usual defined contribution
plan rules (for example, QDROs).
3. Other IRSA Proposals
a.

Spousal Benefits Under Chilean Individual Accounts

Workers have been making contributions to individual
retirement savings accounts in Chile since 1981.18 At retirement, a
worker may choose from two general distribution options. The
worker can either buy a lifetime annuity that is indexed for inflation
and has survivor benefits, or the worker can leave the funds in the
account and make scheduled withdrawals, subject to limits based on
the life expectancy of the retiree and the retiree's dependents. 0 9
Widows and disabled widowers (but not other widowers) receive
60% of the worker's pension, and smaller benefits are available to
certain orphans and dependent parents." 0
b.

Spousal Benefits Under Other Privatization Proposals

Another approach would be to allow workers to have different
104. See COMMIrrEE FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 29, at 35-54.
105. See id. at 51; see also Steuerle, supra note 48, at 1357 (suggesting annuitization of

account balances, as well).
106. See COMMrrrEE FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 29, at 51.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
See Kritzer, supranote 43, at 47.
See id.
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distribution options, depending upon the amount of funds that have
accumulated in the IRSA. Limits would be placed on some basic
amount needed to protect beneficiaries from poverty, but beyond
that basic amount different rules would apply.
For example, under one proposal, basic balances would be
available under three options:
(1) A 100% payout to purchase from the private insurance
industry a minimum-wage life annuity, which would be required to
include disability and survivors' benefits;
(2) Withdrawals as desired with only one constraint-the
amount remaining in the account after withdrawal must always be at
least 110% of the amount necessary to purchase a life annuity
guaranteeing a minimum wage income;
(3) A combination of (1) and (2) with the purchase of a partial
annuity and voluntary withdrawals up to 110% of the amount
necessary to purchase the remaining minimum-wage annuity."'
On the other hand, distributions out of accumulated funds in
excess of basic balances would not be restricted in any way. Finally,
to ensure maintenance of minimum required basic fund balances,
transfers from excess balances to the basic fund would be
12
automatic.
VI. HOW TO PROVIDE SPOUSAL PROTECTIONS UNDER INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
Subpart A discusses some of the key issues that arise with
respect to providing IRSA spousal rights. Next, Subpart B outlines a
modest proposal for IRSA spousal rights. Finally, Subpart C
considers the needs of nontraditional couples.
A.

Key Issues with Respect to ProvidingIRSA Spousal Rights

This Subpart discusses some of the key issues that arise with
respect to providing spousal rights under IRSAs. As a backdrop, the
Subpart compares the current Social Security system with a
hypothetical system of IRSAs. First, this Subpart shows that Social
Security currently provides subsidized spousal benefits, but IRSAs
would not. Second, this Subpart shows that Social Security has
marriage penalties, but IRSAs would not. Finally, this Subpart shows
that Social Security currently forces married couples to take benefits

II1. See BORDEN, supra note 34.
112. See id.
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in the form of a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity, but IRSAs
might not.
1. Social Security Currently Subsidizes Spousal Benefits, but IRSAs
Would Not
Part II showed that Social Security currently provides generous
spouse and surviving spouse benefits and that these benefits are over
and above the benefits that are earned by individual workers. For
example, a single worker with no dependents can receive a benefit at
normal retirement age of just 100% of the worker's PIA, while a
worker with a spouse (who has also reached normal retirement age)
can receive a benefit equal to 150% of the worker's PIA. Similarly, a
surviving spouse of a worker can continue to receive a benefit equal
to 100% of the worker benefit after the worker has died. In some
cases the surviving spouse may live a long time after the worker's
death.
To come up with the money for spousal benefits, the benefits
provided to individual workers must be less than actuarially fair. In
essence, workers subsidize the Social Security benefits provided to
Moreover, because of Social
spouses and surviving spouses.
Security's progressive benefit formula, workers with high lifetime
earnings subsidize the benefits of other workers and their families.
The net effect of these provisions is that the Social Security
system is pretty good for women in general, and for married women
in particular." 3 Women are the principal recipients of spousal
benefits, women tend to live longer than men, and women tend to
have lower lifetime earnings than men. Of particular importance is
the fact that for millions of elderly widows, these subsidized Social
Security benefits are the only thing standing between them and
poverty.
On the other hand, with IRSAs, there would be no redistribution
at all. Payroll contributions and the earnings on those contributions
would remain in individual accounts, and no money would ever be
taken from a worker's account to provide benefits for other workers
113. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and
Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2061 (1996) (discussing this issue and
citing sources); see also CHAIRMAN AND RANKING REPUBLICAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON
RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE HouSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING,
102D CONG., How WELL Do WOMEN FARE UNDER THE NATION'S RETIREMENT
POLICIES (Comm. Print 1992) (same); OLDER WOMEN'S LEAGUE, THE PATH TO
POVERTY: AN ANALYSIS OF WOMEN'S RETIREMENT INCOME (1995 Mother's Day

Report) (1995) (same).
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or their families. Of course, it might make sense to compel individual
workers to share their retirement accounts with their own spouses,
divorced spouses, surviving spouses, and other survivors. But there
would be no redistribution from a worker's account to unrelated
spouses or to unrelated workers with lower lifetime earnings.
Indeed, it may well be that it is this very lack of redistribution to
unrelated workers and families that poses the biggest stumbling block
to replacing all, or even a portion of, Social Security with IRSAs.
Because there would be no redistribution at all under IRSAs, there
would be no redistribution to those elderly Americans whose own
account balances would provide inadequate retirement incomes. In
particular, we need to be concerned about the millions of elderly
widows who would be in poverty today but for the redistributive
surviving spouse benefits provided by the current Social Security
system.
Nevertheless, the lack of redistribution under IRSAs should not
be an absolute bar to their adoption. At the very least, however, it
would necessitate beefing up the first-tier retirement benefits of
those elderly retirees whose IRSA account balances cannot provide
4
adequate retirement incomes."
2. Social Security Has Marriage Penalties, but IRSAs Would Not
Marriage per se does not affect the Social Security tax liabilities
of the individual workers who marry, but it can greatly affect their
benefits. There are significant marriage penalties and bonuses, and
couples with equal total earnings may receive dramatically different
amounts of benefits, depending upon how much is earned by each
spouse." 5
On the other hand, with IRSAs, there would be no marriage
penalties at all. Marriage simply would have no impact on the
balance in an individual worker's account. Again, it might make
sense to compel individual workers to share their retirement accounts
with their own spouses, divorced spouses, and surviving spouses. But
there would be no redistribution to other workers or their spouses,
nor would there be any loss of benefits to the worker and the
worker's family. Payroll contributions and the earnings on those
contributions would be distributed only to the worker and the
worker's family, and no money would ever be taken from a worker's
114. See supra Part V.A.6.
115. See, e.g., Forman, Social Security, supra note 1, at 554-55, 559-60; Forman, What
Can Be Done?, supranote 1, at 16-18.

1998]

CRITICAL TAX THEORY

1679

account to provide benefits for unrelated workers or unrelated
families.
3. Social Security Forces Married Couples to Take Benefits in the
Form of a Joint and Two-Thirds Survivor Annuity, but IRSAs
Might Not
While IRSAs look a lot like bank accounts, Social Security looks
more like a joint and survivor annuity program. At retirement, a
worker covered by Social Security is not allowed to withdraw the
balance of some bank account, real or hypothetical. Instead, at
retirement, Social Security provides monthly benefits over the course
of the worker's life. In short, Social Security pays benefits in the
form of an annuity. Moreover, Social Security benefits are indexed
for inflation.
Also, if a worker is married, Social Security pays monthly
benefits over the joint lives of both husband and wife. For example,
consider a one-earner couple with both spouses aged sixty-five.
While both the worker and the spouse are alive, they can retire and
claim a monthly benefit equal to roughly 150% of what the worker
alone could claim. If the spouse dies, the worker can continue to
claim 100% of the worker benefit. Similarly, if the worker dies, the
surviving spouse can claim a benefit equal to 100% of the worker
benefit. At bottom, Social Security provides the couple with a joint
and survivor annuity. More specifically, the Social Security benefit
looks like a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity. The "two-thirds"
survivor component reflects the fact that the survivor benefit (100%
of the worker's PIA) is two-thirds of the married couple's benefit
116
during life (150% of the worker's PIA for a worker plus spouse).
In short, Social Security provides a forced, indexed, joint and
two-thirds survivor annuity to married couples. This design ensures
at least a modest income stream for most beneficiaries throughout
their lives. In particular, it is this design that has kept millions of
elderly widows out of poverty.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that IRSAs would be
required to pay out benefits in a way that mimics Social Security. In
the simplest case, there might be no limitations on withdrawals (or
borrowing) from IRSA accounts. Literally, there might be nothing to
stop a worker from withdrawing and dissipating the balance of the
account. Moreover, there might be no opportunity to purchase an
annuity, let alone an indexed annuity. And there might be no
116. Mathematically, 2/3 = 100% /150%.
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requirement that a joint and survivor annuity be purchased, let alone
a joint and two-thirds survivor annuity.
Alternatively, IRSAs could fall under the usual ERISA rules
governing pensions. But would that be enough? First, most private
pensions are not even required to pay benefits out in the form of
annuities. Second, private pensions are not required to provide
indexed annuities, nor is there a real private market for indexed
annuities." 7
Third, private pension plans are not required to provide joint
and two-thirds survivor annuities. Generally, only defined benefit
plans must provide survivor annuities at all, and then only joint and
50% survivor annuities." 8 Moreover, with spousal consent even this
form of distribution can be, and presumably frequently is, waived.119
For that matter, neither joint and survivor annuities nor spousal
consent are even required in connection with distributions from most
defined contribution plans and IRAs. All in all, private pension
plans are not required to, nor do they in fact, pay benefits out in the
form of indexed, joint and two-thirds survivor annuities.
B. A Modest Proposalfor IRSA Spousal Rights
All this leads to the conclusion that there should be significant
spousal rights in any IRSA proposal enacted by the federal
government. These spousal rights should be designed to achieve two
goals. First and foremost, spousal rights under IRSAs should help
ensure that all Americans have adequate incomes throughout their
retirement years. Second, spousal rights under IRSAs should help
promote gender equity. Before outlining a modest proposal for
spousal protections under IRSAs, Section 1 briefly discusses the issue
of gender equity.
117. The Treasury Department has started to issue indexed T-bills, and that could help
facilitate the development of a market for indexed annuities. It is also worth noting that
TIAA-CREF, the mega-pension that provides pension benefits to thousands of university
professors, does offer a payout regime that mimics an indexed annuity. See generally Joel
M. Dickson, The Role of Inflation Indexed Bonds, in PROSPECrS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM (Pension Research Council, Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania,
1997 Symposium, May 12-13, 1997) (providing statistics on inflation-protected securities).
118. See supra Part V.A.2.
119. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text; see also Trends in the Selection of
TIAA-CREF Life-Annuity Income Options, 1978-1994, RESEARCH DIALOGUES, July
1996, available at <www.tiaa-cref.org/ rds/rd48.html> (visited April 22, 1998) (showing a
modest increase in the percentage of retirees choosing joint life annuities after the
passage of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984); Watson, supra note 57, at 501 (expressing
the concern that neither ERISA nor REA requires married men to choose the joint and
survivor option).
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1. Whose Pension Is It Anyway?
When I started the research for this Article, I thought that I
would spend a lot more time writing about the issue of gender equity.
In the pension context, the question of gender equity is this: What
rights should spouses have in each other's pensions? In short, whose
pension is it?
Surely, that is the kind of question that has generated this
Symposium. 20 Most likely, however, such questions are best left to
philosophers-like deciding how many angels can dance on the head
of a pin."' More realistically, the "right" answer will vary from
marriage to marriage.'2 Alternatively, perhaps there should be a
presumption that, all other things being equal, a married couple's
IRSAs belong equally to each of the two spouses. In any event, at
this juncture, it should be sufficient simply to conclude that each
spouse needs to have significant rights in the other's IRSAs, if only to
ensure that they both have adequate incomes throughout their
retirement years.
2. A Modest Proposal for Spousal Rights in IRSAs
At the outset, it seems safe to assume that Social Security will
not be wholly privatized. Rather, Social Security seems destined to
be reduced and reformed, and a second tier of IRSAs might be added
on top. These IRSAs should incorporate significant spousal
protections. . In particular, significant limits should be placed on
distributions out of the basic amount needed to protect individuals
and couples from poverty. However, beyond that basic amount,
more relaxed distribution rules could apply.

120. See, e.g., Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law,
91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Staudt, supranote 5.
121. Would the philosopher want to keep track of the relative monetary and
nonmonetary benefits derived from payroll and household work? Perhaps there should
be a presumption that the higher earned income of the primary wage earner would not be
possible without an equally valuable increase in the household work of the secondary
earner.
And what about other aspects of marriage? Would a philosopher try to reach a
solution that equalized the utility of the two spouses? If so, should husbands compensate
wives for the pain of childbirth? Would wives need to compensate husbands for the
utility inherent in longer life expectancies?
122. Cf. Kornhauser, supra note 52 (critiquing the 50150 partnership model of
marriage). For that matter, within any given marriage, the "right" way to split a pension
might vary from year to year, or perhaps from day to day.
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a. Limit IRSA Distributions to Ensure a Basic Annual Income
Throughout Retirement
Taken together, both pieces of the reformed two-tier Social
Security system should ensure that all individuals and couples have
adequate incomes throughout their retirement years.
More
specifically, the target should be to ensure that all elderly citizens
have incomes at least equal to the poverty level, if not 125% of the
poverty level, and their benefits should remain at that level
throughout their lives.
To meet that target, individuals and couples would need to have
the equivalent of an indexed annuity that is targeted at, say, 125% of
the poverty level. Consequently, significant limits should be placed
on IRSA distributions to the extent necessary to meet the targeted
level.
For couples, this limitation would mean designing a system that
would provide the equivalent of an indexed, joint and survivor
annuity that is targeted at 125% of the poverty level. For example, in
1998 the poverty level for a single individual is $8050, and the poverty
level for a couple is $10,850.11 Like current Social Security benefits,
these numbers are adjusted for inflation each year. It should also be
noted that the poverty level of a single individual is roughly 75% of
the poverty level for a married couple. Consequently, assuming a
125%-of-the-poverty-level target, a couple retiring in 1998 would
need the equivalent of an indexed, joint and 75% survivor annuity
that paid $13,562.50 in 1998 ($13,562.50 = 125% times $10,850) and
appropriately adjusted amounts into the future.
The first-tier Social Security benefit could provide a good chunk
of this minimum 125%-of-the-poverty-level benefit. The balance
could come from the second-tier IRSA account, for example, by
purchasing an indexed, joint and survivor annuity either from the
federal government or from the private insurance industry.
At the outset, it would make sense to increase the surviving
spouse benefit in the current Social Security system, perhaps along
the lines proposed by the Social Security Advisory Council. That is,
it would make sense to increase "Social Security's survivor benefits to
the higher of the decedent's benefit (that is, the present-law
survivor's benefit), or 75% of the combined benefit that the survivor
123. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Annual Update of the Health and
Human Services Poverty Guidelines, 63 Fed. Reg. 9235, 9236 (1998). The poverty income
guidelines used here are those applicable to all states (except Alaska and Hawaii) and the
District of Columbia.
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and decedent spouse were receiving when both were alive" (in short,
a joint and 75% survivor annuity). 124
Meeting this 125%-of-the-poverty-level target would also
require significant restrictions on IRSA accumulations and
distributions. Specifically, basic balances should be available under
just three options:
(1) A 100% payout to purchase an indexed, joint and 75%
survivor annuity that, when coupled with the first-tier Social Security
benefit, results in sufficient annual income to meet the 125% of
poverty standard;
(2) Withdrawals as desired with only one constraint: the
amount remaining in the account after withdrawal must always be at
least 110% of the amount necessary to purchase an annuity
guaranteeing the 125%-of-poverty standard;
(3) A combination of (1) and (2).
In short, the IRSAs of a married couple should be geared towards
purchasing an indexed, joint, and 75% survivor annuty 2
Before moving on, it should be noted that millions of Americans
may not reach retirement with sufficient Social Security plus IRSA
benefits to reach the targeted level of benefits. There are millions of
poor elderly Americans today, despite the current redistributive
Social Security system. Shifting to a two-tier Social Security system
with IRSAs will not automatically eliminate poverty among the
elderly, much less push them all to a standard of living equal to 125%
of the poverty level. In short, the approach outlined in this
Subsection would exhaust the balances in the IRSA accounts of
millions of Americans.
Limit Excess IRSA Distributions to Protect Spousal Rights
For those individuals and couples who retire with IRSA balances
that are more than sufficient to meet the basic, targeted benefit level,
b.

there still might be reasons to impose restrictions on withdrawals.

Indeed, it could make sense to compel annuitization of excess
balances for all but the most extraordinarily large accounts, and it
could make sense to compel the same joint and 75% survivor
124. 1 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 36, at 19. This kind of result
could be achieved directly, or perhaps in connection with a broader scheme to move the
entire Social Security system towards earnings sharing. See, e.g., Forman, Social Security,
supra note 1, at 557.
125. Cf.Vicki Gottlich et al., Ten Pension Guidelinesto Prevent Poverty Among Older
Women, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.616, 619 (1995) (describing ways to improve spousal
benefits in private pensions).
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approach that was applicable to the basic balances. Alternatively,
IRSAs could be subjected to the usual QJSAIQPSA regime (albeit
with 75% survivor annuities)."2 6 At the very least, spouses should be

entitled to information about their spouses' IRSAs, and should be
required to give consent to any significant withdrawals.
c.

Split IRSAs at Divorce

The default in the current QDRO regime should be changed, at
least for IRSAs. The funds accumulated during marriage in IRSAs
should be divided between divorced spouses unless the court orders
or the parties agree otherwise. 27
d. Other Restrictions on IRSAs
Except for assignments to spouses at divorce or separation, and
for assignments to significant others," ERISA's anti-alienation rule
should generally apply to IRSAs. It would probably also make sense
to limit withdrawals and loans from IRSAs unless the account had an
extraordinarily large balance. These restrictions would help build
and preserve the accumulated funds to ensure that they would be
available to meet basic retirement income needs.
C. What to Do About NontraditionalCouples
The United States legal system treats married couples quite
differently than nontraditional couples. In particular, these laws
often ignore the very real needs of nontraditional couples to share in
each other's economic resources during life and at death. 12 9 Indeed,
when it comes to private pensions, ERISA's anti-alienation rule can
actually undermine the ability of a worker to make adequate
provision for loved ones. For example, a gay worker under a defined
benefit plan cannot elect a QJSA with a partner, nor can two siblings
who live together ensure such a benefit.
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 provided an exception to the
anti-alienation rule to allow QDROs that enable state courts to split
pensions at divorce or separation. But nontraditional couples cannot
secure QDROs either. Of course, an unmarried worker can assign
the balance of a defined contribution plan or IRA to a significant
126. Perhaps that kind of spousal protection should be provided for all defined
contribution plans and IRAs. Cf. id.
127. See id.; Moss & Gottlich, supra note 73, at 290; Steuerle, supra note 48, at 1357.
128. See infraPart VI.C.
129. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriageand the
Legal Needs ofLesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1996).
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other at death, but that is scant and effervescent protection, at best.
In short, adequate protection for nontraditional couples requires
more than current law allows. With respect to IRSAs, one solution
would be for the federal government to allow workers to assign up to
half of their annual IRSA contributions to appropriately defined
partners or family members. Alternatively, the federal government
could let state law and state courts make the necessary allocations.
Unfortunately, the prospects for adoption of either of these
solutions seem particularly dim today. After all, it was just in 1997
that a Republican Congress passed and a Democratic President
13 The federal tiger
signed the so-called "Defense of Marriage Act.""
does not lose its stripes so quickly.
Does this mean that we should abandon the idea of IRSA
spousal rights altogether? I think not. It seems appropriate to assure
adequate retirement incomes and equity for spouses today, even if we
must wait until tomorrow to do the right thing for nontraditional
couples.
VII. CONCLUSION

If the federal government decides to use IRSAs to replace or
supplement Social Security, it must ensure that the spouses and
surviving spouses of workers are afforded adequate retirement
incomes throughout their retirement years. Specifically, IRSAs
should be required to distribute at least basic benefits in the form of
an indexed, joint, and 75% survivor annuity that would ensure that
couples and survivors have adequate retirement incomes. For
couples whose IRSA balances are sufficient to ensure that they will
have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years, the usual
QJSA/QPSA regime could be applied, albeit with survivor annuities
that provide a benefit at least equal to 75% of the joint annuity
(unless the spouse consents to an alternative distribution). Finally, at
divorce, the funds accumulated in IRSAs during marriage should be
divided between divorced spouses (unless the court orders, or the
parties agree, otherwise).

130. The Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), was
passed by Congress, but let's not forget that it was signed by President Bill Clinton.

